The general understanding of the United States in Marx's historiographic vision is fairly straightforward, however. The American Revolution was, like its counterpart in France, a bourgeois revolution, which had the social aim of overthrowing the feudal-aristocratic order and imposing the rule of the capitalist middle classes, or in Marxist terminology the bourgeoisie. What made the American Revolution special for Marx, however, was that feudalism had no real roots in America in the first place, it was "subordinate to bourgeois society" from the very beginning; this, combined with the fact that America was a whole new continent available for exploitation, allowed the bourgeoisie to "develop to hitherto unheard-of dimensions". [1]

As he makes clear in On the Jewish Question, this is also reflected in the United States' commodification of religion. In the US, "the relation of religion to the state" is crystallised in its pure form. "The preaching of the Gospel itself and the Christian ministry have become articles of trade, and the bankrupt trader deals in the Gospel just as the Gospel preacher who has become rich goes in for business deals". [2] The bourgeois revolution in the United States has subjugated and commodified religion to an extent not seen anywhere else.

In 1846, in fact, Marx described America as the "most progressive nation" on the planet. [3] Now, this is a rather ambiguous quote because he is actually describing what he thinks Proudhon says about America, but if you read the passage as a whole it seems clear he agrees on that point, just not the idea he ascribes to Proudhon, namely that racial slavery is well and good because it sustains American economic life.

Marx supported the intensification of bourgeois relations, as in the United States, as a prelude to proletarian revolution: "In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, that I vote in favor of free trade." [4]

Interestingly, later on, Marx actually put his name to a letter to Abraham Lincoln, which was submitted by the International Working Men's Association in 1864 and received by the American government. The text of this letter is reproduced here, and is worth a read since it's very short. Of particular interest is the final paragraph:

The workingmen of Europe feel sure that, as the American War of Independence initiated a new era of ascendancy for the middle class, so the American Antislavery War [i.e., the Civil War] will do for the working classes. They consider it an earnest of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of an enchained race and the reconstruction of a social world.

Also of interest is that Ambassador Adams' reply on behalf of Lincoln is cordial and seems to accept the sentiments of the letter in full!

Sources:

[1] In Bruce Cumings, 'Revising Post-Revisionism, Or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History', in America in the World: The Historiography of US Foreign Relations Since 1941, p. 48.

[2] http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/

[3] http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1846/letters/46_12_28.htm

[4] http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/01/09ft.htm#marx

It was at this period, however, that Lenin drafted his famous “Testament,” which undoubtedly reflects his forebodings with regard to Stalin’s brusqueness but says not one word in criticism of his policy…. Nor did Stalin challenge him on his return to activity in the latter part of the year. On the contrary, it appeared they were in complete accord…. Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 146

There is no criticism in a [A OR THE] document–Lenin’s testament–of Stalin’s policy, but only this delineation of personal qualities, That Stalin deeply felt Lenin’s personal criticism is certain. For more than 20 years Lenin had been his teacher and he a faithful disciple. But he could “take it.” He has many of the qualities of the master. He is no yes-man. He has deep convictions, tremendous will-power and determination, and–could Lenin have lived long enough to see it–a patience which at times seems inexhaustible. Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 151

…although subsequent events proved that he [Lenin] had over-estimated Trotsky and underestimated his “wonderful Georgian.” When he [Stalin] read it [Lenin’s Testament] to the 13th Congress of the Party and commented, “Yes, I [Stalin] am rude to those who would destroy Lenin’s party, etc..,” he shifted the issue from one of good manners to the larger battle — ground of the principles, aims and role of the Party as the leader of the Revolution. Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 154

There began already at that time, though not openly, the struggle between Trotsky and Zinoviev for the succession to Lenin. But there was discussion also as to what was going on at Lenin’s house at Gorky, in other words about Stalin. Thus it was almost a sensation when Kamenev brought the news that Lenin had broken with Stalin, and had written to Stalin dismissing him. Before long, however, the sensation shrank to its true proportions. It turned out that the actual personal difference had nothing to do with politics: Lenin had charged Stalin with rudeness and tactlessness toward his wife Krupskaya. It is easy to imagine that. It appears that Stalin never had any great opinion of Lenin’s wife. Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 106

Lenin’s “testament” is, of course, favorable for the most part to Stalin; compared with the assessments given the others, the one of Stalin was the most positive…. But Lenin had for the entire preceding period given many descriptions of Trotsky, and they were entirely negative…. Stalin was, of course, distinguished by rudeness. He was a very blunt person. But if not for his harshness I don’t know how much good would have been accomplished. I think harshness was necessary, otherwise there would have been even greater vacillation and irresolution. Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993, p. 213

This addendum to Lenin’s testament was read after his death to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee. Basseches, Nikolaus. Stalin. London, New York: Staples Press, 1952, p. 108

Khrushchev’s treatment of the relations between Stalin and Lenin concentrates on Lenin’s growing apprehension of Stalin’s bureaucratic methods in 1923. He omits Lenin’s earlier admiration for Stalin and his forwarding of Stalin’s career in the Party dating back at least to 1912. Nor does he note that Lenin’s later attacks on Stalin were made when Lenin was ill and cut off from Party activity, and that even then, in his “testament,” he considered Stalin to be one of the outstanding Party leaders, his faults not those of “non-Bolshevism”–as with Trotsky–but of an over-bureaucratic method of work and personal “rudeness.” The fact that people who had “worked with Lenin” were executed means little unless we know who the people were and why they were executed. The fact that people worked with Lenin does not mean they were pro-socialist, as witness Kamenev & Zinoviev, both of whom Lenin condemned in his “testament.” Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 124

[In the Testament] neither his [Stalin] orthodoxy as a party man nor his loyalty to Lenin were called to question. Graham, Stephen. Stalin. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1970, p. 90

Another strange thing: of all those mentioned in the letter Stalin appears in the most favorable light. He is the one Lenin accuses of rudeness and intolerance, but that was never regarded as a fault in the proletarian party. Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalin. New York: Doubleday, c1996, p. 208

STALIN VOLUNTEERS TO RESIGN AFTER LENIN’S CRITICISM

So young Joseph — Soso, they called him…. Lenin criticized Stalin. Stalin told this himself three years ago in open Congress of the Communist Party, and said quietly: “I told you then and I repeated now, that I am ready to retire if you wish.” Duranty, Walter. Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 168

When Stalin came to speak [before the Central Committee in October 1927] he declared that he had twice offered his resignation as General Secretary, but that the Party had rejected it on both occasions. Chamberlin, William Henry. Soviet Russia. Boston: Little, Brown, 1930, p. 96

When Lenin’s testament became public property through having been spread furtively by word-of-mouth, Stalin submitted his resignation,… Ludwig, Emil, Stalin. New York, New York: G. P. Putnam’s sons, 1942, p. 95

For nearly a year while he lived Lenin did nothing with his statement and it was only after his death that it was presented to the Party. When it was presented, Stalin offered his resignation but the Party, including Trotsky, would not accept it. Davis, Jerome. Behind Soviet Power. New York, N. Y.: The Readers’ Press, Inc., c1946, p. 25

Stalin consequently offered to resign but the Central Committee refused to accept his resignation. Cameron, Kenneth Neill. Stalin, Man of Contradiction. Toronto: NC Press, c1987, p. 49

It must have come as a relief for him [Stalin] when it was decided that the Congress would be bypassed and the notes would not be published. Nevertheless, when the newly elected Central Committee met, he offered his resignation. He was probably confident that those he had carefully selected for election would not accept it. In any event the committee, including Trotsky, voted unanimously not to accept his resignation. Grey, Ian. Stalin, Man of History. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, p. 197

Right from the first session of the Central Committee, after the 13th Congress, I asked to be released from the obligations of the General Secretaryship. The Congress itself examined the question. Each delegation examined the question, and every delegation, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, voted unanimously in favor of Stalin remaining at his post. What could I do then? Abandon my post? Such a thing is not in my character…. At the end of one year I again asked to be set free and I was again forced to remain at my post. What could I do then? Stalin, Joseph. Stalin’s Kampf. New York: Howell, Soskin & Company, c1940, p. 244

[In 1927 Stalin stated], I asked the first plenary session of the Central Committee right after the Thirteenth Congress to relieve me of my duties as secretary-general. The congress discussed the question. Each delegation discussed the question. And unanimously they all, including Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, made it binding upon Stalin to remain in his post. What could I do? Run away from the post? This is not in my character. I never ran away from any post and I have no right to run away. That would be desertion. I do not regard myself as a free man, and I obey party orders. A year later I again submitted my resignation, but again I was bound to remain. What could I do? Levine, Isaac Don. Stalin. New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 281

It is said that in that “will” Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin’s “rudeness” it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin’s place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the 13th Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post. What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey. A year later I again put in a request to the plenum to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at my post. What else could I do? As regards publishing the “will,” the congress decided not to publish it, since it was addressed to the congress and was not intended for publication…. Stalin, Joseph. Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1952, Vol. 10, p. 180-181

After the congress [May 1924], when the leading bodies of the party were being constituted, Stalin, referring to Lenin’s testament, demonstratively declined to accept the post of general secretary. But Zinoviev and Kamenev, and after them the majority of the central committee members, persuaded him to withdraw his resignation…. Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 85

[Continued in comments]

His [Stalin] method of working is somewhat different from Lenin’s. Lenin usually presented his “theses” for discussion by the Political Bureau, committee, or commission. He would supplement his written document with a speech amplifying the ideas contained in it, after which every member would be invited to make his critical observations, to amend or provide an alternative. Lenin would consult specialists on particular aspects of a problem, and no one ever went to such lengths to talk matters over with the workers individually and collectively. Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172

Stalin on the other hand rarely presents theses and resolutions first. He will introduce a “problem” or a “subject” requiring a decision in terms of policy. The members of the Political Bureau, the Central Committee, or the commission of which he may be the chairman, are invited to say what they think about the problem and its solution. People known to be specially informed on the topic are invited to contribute to discussion, whether they are members of the committee are not. Out of the fruits of such collective discussion, either he himself will formulate the decision or resolution, or someone specially fitted will prepare the draft. Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172

Stalin holds the view that decisions made by one person are nearly always one-sided. He does not believe in “intuition’s.” He regards the Bolshevik Central Committee as the collective wisdom of the Party, containing the best managers of industry, military leaders, agitators, propagandists, organizers, the men and women best acquainted with the factories, mills, mines, farms, and different nationalities comprising the life of the Soviet Union. And the Political Bureau of this Central committee he regards as its best and most competent part. If its members are otherwise they will not hold their positions for long. Hence he believes in everyone having freedom to correct the mistakes of individuals, and in there being less chance of a collective decision proving lop-sided than an individual one. But once a decision is arrived at he likes to see it carried out with military precision and loyalty. Throughout his career his victories have been triumphs of team-work and of his native capacity to lead the team by securing a common understanding of the task in hand. Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 172

Suppose today Stalin outlines a policy which he thinks should be adopted. Others criticize it, not to weaken it, but to fill in possible holes. Stalin answers. Some amendments are accepted; the majority fail. The final decision is reached only when everyone is convinced that no improvement is possible. Such is the real government of Soviet Russia. Duranty, Walter. Duranty Reports Russia. New York: The Viking Press, 1934, p. 103

Stalin was less sure of himself than Lenin. Instead of saying, “I am right unless you can prove me wrong,” he would ask the advice of others and gradually form a composite opinion and decision. Once that opinion was formed, however, he was much more rigid than Lenin about subsequent misgivings or opposition. Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 164

He [Stalin] loved to hear the other members of the leadership expounding their views, while he would wait until the end before giving his own, which would usually clinch the matter. Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 220

Bazhanov goes on to describe Stalin’s behavior at meetings of the Politburo and the Central Committee. Stalin never presided at these: “He smoked his pipe and spoke very little. Every now and then he would start walking up and down the conference room regardless of the fact that we were in session. Sometimes he would stop right in front of a speaker, watching his expression and listing to his argument while still puffing away at his pipe…. He had the good sense never to say anything before everyone else had his argument fully developed. He would sit there, watching the way the discussion was going. Whenever everyone had spoken, he would say: “Well, comrades, I think the solution to this problem is such and such”–and he would then repeat the conclusions toward which the majority had been drifting.” Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. New York: Knopf, 1992, p. 180

That’s how it is with Stalin, in terms of actual power, but according to all accounts he is far from domineering in dealing with his colleagues. Lenin, we are told, took a different attitude. He used to say: “Here is what I think our policy should be. If anyone has suggestions to offer or can make any improvements, I am willing to listen. Otherwise, let us consider my plan adopted.” Stalin is more inclined to begin, if the subject matter discussion concerns foreign affairs: “I should like to hear from Molotov.” Then, he might continue, “Now, what does Voroshilov think on the military aspects of the subject,” and later he would ask Kaganovich about the matter in relation to industry and transportation. Gradually he would get a compromise opinion from the Politburo, probably “leading” the discussion along the lines he desires, but not appearing to lay down the law, until the final conclusion is reached. Thus, superficially at least, he seems to act as a chairman of a board, or arbiter, rather than as the boss. Duranty, Walter. Stalin & Co. New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1949, p. 90

As a rule, he was businesslike and calm; everybody was permitted to state his opinion. He addressed everyone in the same stern and formal manner. He had the knack of listening to people attentively, but only if they spoke to the point, if they knew what they were saying. Taciturn himself, he did not like talkative people and often interrupted those who spoke volubly with a curt “make it snappy” or “speak more clearly.” He opened conferences without introductory words. He spoke quietly, freely, never departing from the substance of the matter. He was laconic and formulated his thoughts clearly. Zhukov, Georgi. Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 1. Moscow: Progress Pub., c1985, p. 364

According to Bazhanov, who served for several years as a junior secretary in the Political Bureau, Stalin at the meetings of this high tribunal maintains his usual reserve. He seldom generalizes. He sees only concrete problems and seeks practical solutions. He attacks few questions and rarely makes mistakes. “At the meetings of the Political Bureau,” he writes in his revelations, “I always had the impression that Stalin was much more inclined to follow events than to direct them. During discussions he would keep silent and listen attentively. He never would give his opinion until the debate was over and then would propose in a few words, as if it were his own idea, the solution on which the majority of his assistants had already agreed. For that reason his opinion was ordinarily adopted. Stalin is not imaginative, but he is steadfast. He is not brilliant, but he knows his limitations. He is not universal; he is single-tracked. These properties may be defects, but in Stalin’s position they are sources of strength. He is a “big business man,” a type new in Russian political life. He is the carrier of that modern “ism” which has invaded the Old World–Americanism. Levine, Isaac Don. Stalin. New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, c1931, p. 337-338

The sharpest test of the conscience remaking of human character is found in the Soviet policy for handling law-breakers. The Soviet criminologist holds neither of the theories on which the prevalent systems of prison regime in capitalist countries are based. He does not believe in the existence of “born criminals” whose will must be broken by brutal suppression nor does he rely on emotional appeals to the “better nature” of the criminal, for he knows that this better nature exists as yet only in rudimentary form. “We don’t assume that a man of anti-social habits will be at once reclaimed by gifts of chocolate, nice bathrooms, and soft words,” a leading Soviet penologist told me. “Men are made over by a new social environment and especially by their work done collectively.”

Soviet law aims to make over social misfits while protecting society from their attacks. Punishment as vengeance has no place in such an aim: revenge merely incites revenge in return. To make prisoners sit in solitude and think of their sins produces a fixation on crime. To “break a man’s will” or lessen his human dignity in any way injures him as material for a creative socialist society.

Soviet justice therefore aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better; the less he feels himself in prison the better…. “We have a double approach,” said Attorney-General Vyshinsky in an interview. “Active, confirmed enemies of our Soviet power who stick at nothing to injure us must be ruthlessly crushed…. But if we had tried to apply the idea of absolute humanitarianism to bitter enemies we wouldn’t be here today.”

Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 254

The labor camp is the prevalent method for handling serious offenders of all kinds, whether criminal or political…. The labor camps have won high reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of men have been reclaimed. They have, however, been the center of some of the most spectacular attacks on the Soviet Union in recent years. Allegations of brutal treatment and even of torture have found their way widely into the foreign press.

While it is clearly impossible to check every one of these accusations, they are contradicted by every competent observer who has ever seen the camps. Dr. Mary Stevens Callcott, the American penologist who has studied prisons all over the world, and who has had the unique experience of visiting the larger part of the Soviet camps, including those for the worst–and for political–offenders, has commented both in her book Soviet Justice and in conversations with me personally, on the “amazingly normal” life that differentiates these camps from prisons in any other part of the world.

She notes the freedom of movement over large areas of territory, the very small amount of guarding, the work done under normal conditions–7 hours for ordinary labor to 10 for men whose tasks, such as driving a truck, permitted frequent rests during work. She could find no speed up; laws of labor protection operated as in factories. Wages were the same as those outside, with deductions for living expenses; all above this could be sent by the prisoner to his family, saved, or spent as he chose. “No uniforms with their psychological implications, no physical abuse; isolation only in extreme instances. Privileges and special rewards replace the system of special penalties.”

Among these special rewards are the two weeks’ vacation in which the prisoner may leave the camp, and the opportunities given for his family not only to visit him but even to live with him for extended periods. Normal human association goes on; men and women meet and may even marry while serving sentence, in which case they are given separate quarters.

What most impressed Dr. Callcott, however, was the type of men in charge of these camps, and the relation they had to the prisoners. She tells of going through the Moscow-Volga Canal camp with its director. Prisoners hailed him with obvious pleasure and informality. A girl rushed up to detain him by seizing the belt of his uniform lest he get away before she could tell him something. A teacher whose term was about to expire expressed a wish to stay on and work under him. There were only five officials in the central administration office of this camp of many thousand prisoners; all the work, including most of the guarding, was done by the convicted men themselves. “In fact,” said Dr. Callcott, “I can never see what kept men in this camp unless they wanted to stay there. No convicts I have known would have any difficulty if they wanted to break away.”

Both prisoners and officials, of whom Dr. Callcott asked this question–she talked with prisoners freely without the presence of officials–replied that they didn’t run away because it they did, “nobody in my working gang would speak to me when I came back. They would say I had disgraced them.” There are, however, a certain number of incorrigibles who run away repeatedly, and these are given somewhat closer guarding for a time. Political prisoners, she noted, were treated like everyone else, except that those who had been persistent and dangerous in their attacks on the government were sent away from the possibility of connection with their past associates. In all her conversations with these “politicals,” she was unable to find one who had been sentenced merely for expressing anti-Soviet views. All were charged with definite action against the government. “I did everything I could to destroy this government,” one such man frankly told her, “sabotage of the most serious kind. But the way they have treated me here has convinced me that they are right.”

Another prisoner, who had been in Sing Sing, San Quentin, as well as in jails of England, Spain, and Germany, before he was picked up by the Soviets for grand larceny, had been reclaimed by the Baltic-White Sea Canal. He had done a bit of engineering in his youth, and was promptly given a chance to work at this specialty. He won a metal, pursued his studies further, and was doing brilliant work on the Moscow-Volga Canal when Dr. Callcott met him. To her query about his reformation he replied: “in the other countries they treated me like a prisoner, clapped me in jail and taught me my place. Here they clapped me on the back and said “what can we do to make you into a useful citizen?”

Dr. Callcott conversed with many men now high in Soviet industry who had previously been reclaimed by the labor camps. Nothing in their attitude or that of those about them showed any stigma remaining from their prison life. “Of course, when it’s over, it’s forgotten,” one of them said to her. “That,” says Dr. Callcott, “is real restoration.” Information from many other sources and from my own observation corroborates Dr. Callcott.

Strong, Anna Louise. This Soviet World. New York, N. Y: H. Holt and company, c1936, p. 256

Source

“As soon as the Bolsheviks break away from the masses and lose contact with them, they should cover themselves with bureaucratic rust, so that they lose all strength and become an empty shell,” Stalin warned

Today, even the vicious enemies of Soviet power do not deny the rapid economic development of the Soviet country in the pre-war years. True, the slanderers are trying to denigrate the labor feat of the Soviet people, keeping silent about the popular enthusiasm of the builders of the first Stalinist five-year plans and assuring that the Soviet economy was created only with the help of gross violence. However, it is impossible to deny the existence of factories, factories, entire industries, large cities created during the Stalinist five-year plans that still exist today.

But the anti-Soviets do not want to hear when evidence is presented about the democratic character of the Soviet political system. Having distorted the concept of "democracy", which from time immemorial meant "rule of the people," the apologists of capitalism assert that the bourgeois system, which consolidates the omnipotence of the exploiting minority, is the pinnacle of democracy. Since the victory of capitalism in Russia put an end to true democracy and no traces of the former democracy remain, it is easier for slanderers to prove, especially to the generation born after 1991, that the USSR was a kingdom of tyranny and terror.

The slanderers who control the mass consciousness of modern Russia are especially hated by the evidence of Stalin's role in the implementation of democratic political transformations. They hysterically declare that Stalin and democracy are incompatible concepts. Perhaps for this reason, citing indisputable archival documents about the political reforms of the 30s, carried out on the initiative of I.V. Stalin, the historian Yuri Zhukov called his book "Another Stalin". The idea of ​​Stalin as a fighter for the democratization of Soviet society contradicts the ideas embedded in the mass consciousness. Indeed, in accordance with them, the Soviet system, created on the basis of communist doctrine, is the embodiment of tyranny.

Meanwhile, Stalin's struggle for democratic political reforms naturally and logically followed from his Marxist-Leninist ideas about the development of democracy as socialism was being built, as well as about the correspondence of the political institutions of society to the nature of its economic relations. In the mid-1930s, Stalin raised the question of the need for democratic changes in the country's constitutional structure, which would reflect the grandiose changes that had taken place in the economy and social life of Soviet society.

How the 1936 Constitution was created

The current authorities and the bourgeois media try not to remember the Stalinist Constitution. If it is mentioned, it is portrayed as a "smokescreen" designed to hide the mass repressions prepared in advance. So, in his book about Stalin, E. Radzinsky wrote: "Before the New Year, Stalin arranged a holiday for the people: he gave him the Constitution, written by poor Bukharin." This short phrase contains several factual errors. First, the Constitution was adopted not “just before the New Year,” but on December 5, 1936. Secondly, the new Constitution was not "given" from above. Its adoption was preceded by many months of nationwide discussions of the draft constitution. Thirdly, Bukharin was not the author of the Constitution, but only headed one of the subcommissions on its preparation.

The myth of Bukharin as the creator of the Soviet Constitution is constantly repeated today on all television channels. The host of the Top Secret program Svyatoslav Kucher called Bukharin the "Creator of the Constitution". Even during one of the popular programs "Clever and Clever", its participants were taught that the Constitution of 1936 was written by Bukharin.

In fact, the Constitution was not the product of one man's efforts. The development of individual sections of the Basic Law of the USSR was carried out by 12 subcommissions, and their proposals were summarized by the editorial commission, which consisted of twelve chairmen of the subcommissions. At the same time, the facts indicate that the initiative to revise the 1924 constitution, and then to create a new constitution, came from I.V. Stalin. At a meeting of the Politburo on May 10, 1934, at the suggestion of Stalin, a decision was made to amend the country's Constitution. Stalin headed the entire editorial commission, as well as the subcommittee on general issues.

In a conversation with the author of this article, the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Lukyanov told how in 1962, fulfilling the instructions of the then leadership of the country, he had the opportunity for several months to study archival materials concerning Stalin's work on the draft Constitution. A detailed note on this issue of several hundred pages was written by Lukyanov and presented by him to the Presidium of the Central Committee.

From the materials with which he got acquainted, it followed that in the course of their work, the members of the editorial commission brought Stalin various versions of the so-called rough draft of the draft constitution. After that, Stalin re-ruled her articles over and over again.

A.I. Lukyanov emphasized: “Joseph Vissarionovich understood very well that the essence of socialist democracy is to ensure real human rights in society. And when N. Bukharin, who headed the legal subcommittee, proposed to preface the text of the constitution with the "Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Citizens of the USSR," Stalin did not agree with this and insisted that the rights of a Soviet citizen be enshrined directly in the articles of the constitution. Moreover, they were not just proclaimed, but guaranteed in the most detailed way. So for the first time in world practice, the Basic Law of the country introduced the rights to work, rest, free education and health care, social security in old age and in case of illness. "

Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov further noted: “It was amazing how meticulously Stalin worked on the wording of each article of the constitution. He revised them many times before bringing the final text up for discussion. So the 126th article, which deals with the right of citizens to unite, Stalin wrote himself and rewrote and revised several times. " In total, Stalin personally wrote eleven of the most significant articles of the Basic Law of the USSR.

According to Lukyanov, Stalin, trying to develop the democratic foundations of the Soviet system, carefully looked at the historical experience of world parliamentarism. A record of his speech has been preserved in the archives: “There will be no congresses ... The Presidium is the interpreter of laws. The legislator is a session (parliament) ... The executive committee is not good, there are no more congresses. Soviet of Working People's Deputies. Two chambers. Supreme Legislative Assembly ". By agreement with I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov, in his report at the VII Congress (February 1935), spoke of a gradual movement "towards a kind of Soviet parliaments in the republics and towards an all-Union parliament."

At the same time, Lukyanov emphasized, it should be borne in mind that Stalin did not mechanically copy the models of parliamentary practice, but took into account the experience of the Soviets accumulated over two decades. He personally included in the text of the Constitution the 2nd and 3rd articles, stating that the political basis of the USSR is made up of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and became stronger as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landowners and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that all power in the USSR belongs to the working people of the city and villages, represented by the Soviets, who do not know the division of powers and have the right to consider any issues of national and local importance.

Another important principle was the supremacy of the Soviets over all accountable state bodies based on mass representation (more than 2 million deputies) and the right of the Soviets to decide, directly or through their subordinate bodies, all issues of state, economic and socio-cultural development.

By March 1936, work on the text was largely completed. In April, the "Rough Draft" of the Constitution of the USSR was developed. It, in turn, was revised into the "Preliminary draft of the Constitution of the USSR", which on May 15, 1936 was adopted by the constitutional commission. Then the project was approved by the June (1936) plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and on June 11 - by the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee, which ordered its publication.

The draft Constitution of the USSR was published in all newspapers of the country, broadcast on the radio, published in separate brochures in one hundred languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR with a circulation of over 70 million copies. The scope of the nationwide discussion of the draft is evidenced by the following data: it was discussed at 450 thousand meetings and 160 thousand plenums of the Soviets and their executive committees, meetings of sections and deputy groups; over 50 million people (55% of the country's adult population) took part in these meetings and sessions; during the discussion, about 2 million amendments, additions and proposals to the project were made. The latter circumstance testifies to the fact that the discussion of the draft was not formal.

(Continued in the comments)

The October Revolution, officially known as the Great October Socialist Revolution under the Soviet Union, also known the Bolshevik Revolution or Red October, It constituted the radicalization of the Russian Revolution of 1917, after the February Revolution and the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II.

It was led by the Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, it meant the first declared socialist revolution of the 20th century, with the participation of workers, peasants and soldiers through the soviets. At the end of the First World War, peace, bread and land were proposed for the people. Equality between men and women. Education and culture in their own languages for the different nations of Tsarist Russia. It proved that a government run by peasants, workers and soldiers was possible.

The October Revolution was one of the most important events in contemporary times. Its impact was palpable in both America and Europe. Although the Revolution did not spread Communism as an immediate effect, it gave other troubled Third World countries an example to follow. Decades later, the philosophical / governmental model would take on renewed prominence as the Soviet Union, turned into a socialist state and an economic and military superpower, faced the United States in the Cold War.

Economic causes :stonks-down:

The economic causes of the Russian Revolution are largely attributed to the mismanagement of the Tsar, adding the Empire to the First World War. More than fifteen million men joined the army, which left insufficient numbers of workers in factories and farms. The result was a widespread shortage of food and raw materials. The workers had to endure terrible working conditions, including twelve to fourteen hour shifts and low wages.

Large riots and strikes broke out demanding better conditions and higher wages. There was a protest to which Nicolás responded with violence, in response, the industrial workers went on strike and effectively paralyzed the railroad and other transport networks. In 1917, famine threatened many of the big cities.

Social causes :angrels:

The social causes of the Revolution have their origin in centuries of oppression of the Tsarist regime on the dispossessed.

About 85% of the Russian people were part of the peasantry, oppressed by the feudal aristocracy and imperial officials. Vassal, commonly associated with the Middle Ages, accurately describes the social situation of Russia in the early 20th century.

World War I only increased the chaos. The huge demand for industrial production of war articles and workers caused many more insurrections and strikes. Furthermore, as many workers were needed in the factories, the peasants migrated to the cities, which were soon overcrowded, living under rapidly worsening conditions. To top it all, while the amount of food required by the army was increasing, the supply behind the front became poorer and poorer. The sum of all the above factors contributed to a growing discontent among Russian citizens, which would later lead to the Revolution.

Political causes :marx-goth:

From at least 1904, the workers of Russia suffered a dire economic situation. Many of them worked eleven hours a day. Health and safety conditions at work were precarious, and wages fell. There were numerous strikes and protests over time. Most of them were ignored by the tsarist government or repressed, sometimes in a bloody way.

The failure of Russian foreign policy, especially in the Far East with the failed attempt to conquer Manchuria and the debacle of the imperial army and navy during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 caused deep discomfort in different social sectors of the country.

Part of the intellectual class (educated in many cases in the West) also rejected the tsarist autocracy. In 1915, the situation became critical when Nicolás decided to take direct control of the army, personally supervising the war front and leaving his incapable wife Alejandra in charge of the government. By October 1916, Russia had lost between 1.6 and 1.8 million soldiers, to which must be added two million prisoners of war and one million missing. These figures did little to morale in the army. Riots began, and in 1916 rumors of fraternization with the enemy began to circulate. The soldiers were starving and short of shoes, ammunition, and even weapons. Nicholas was blamed for these calamities, and what little support he still had left began to falter.

As this general discontent and hatred for Nicholas II grew, the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament made up of landlords, citizens, industrial workers and peasants) issued a warning to the Tsar in November 1916, declaring that the disaster upon the nation if constitutional reforms were not implemented. As expected, Nicolás ignored it. The result was not delayed, and, several months later, the regime collapsed during the February Revolution of 1917.

The October Revolution :lenin-da:

On October 25, 1917 (November 7 according to the Gregorian Calendar), the maximum leader of the Bolshevik Party, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin, led the uprising in Petrograd, the then capital of Russia, against the provisional government of Alexander Feodorovich Kerensky.

The Red Guard, led by the Bolsheviks, seized the main government buildings before launching a final assault on the Winter Palace during the night of November 7-8. The assault, led by Vladimir Antónov Ovséyenko, was launched at 9:45 PM after a salvo shot from the Cruiser Aurora. The palace was taken around two in the morning of the 8th; November 7 would be officially established as the date of the Revolution.

Consequences :stalin-pipe:

The heroic days of October - as described by the American journalist John Reed - shook the world. A new epoch has opened for humanity. No subsequent event can overshadow the greatness of the Russian Bolsheviks. On November 7, 1917, the highest of the European political intelligentsia was combined with the revolutionary spirit of the Russian working class and the struggle of the peasants for land and their rights.

The exploits of 1917 and the years in which Lenin led the process constitute milestones of exemplary and imperishable value in the struggle of the peoples for the conquest of freedom. For years and decades, the communists and the people of the USSR fought colossal battles and made prodigious advances in the economic, social, political, cultural and military fields. In a relatively short historical time, they turned the impoverished and exploited country they inherited into a world power of the first order.

The Russian Revolution was the first to be won by the proletariat, since the French Revolution - bourgeois in character - left intact capitalist private ownership of the means of production as the prevailing economic system. Instead, the Russian Revolution was the tangible proof that the outcasts of the earth needed to be sure that Marx's dream was not unreal.

The Great October Socialist Revolution opened for Humanity a new era, that of the passage from the theory of scientific socialism to the human practice of socialism.

Socialist revolution :hammer-sickle:

It is nothing more than a radical qualitative transformation of society, which marks the transition from capitalism to socialism. The socialist revolution substitutes the relations of production of domination and subordination, based on private property, by the relations of collaboration and mutual aid, with which the exploitation of man by man is liquid. It has a creative character.

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One of the most large-scale projects of the world history - the so-called Great Plan of Nature Transformation, called "Stalin's Plan", because its development and approval at the legislative level (October 20, 1948) were initiated and personally controlled by I.V. Stalin [Bushinsky, p.9]. The plan was intended to solve several problems at once: the tasks of the immediate future were the rapid restoration of the national economy after the devastation caused by German Nazism; the next set of tasks covered the general improvement of the culture of land use in order to ensure the food security of the population in the long run; and finally the third set of tasks included the further evolution of large socio – technical systems through the acquisition of innovative technologies of environmental management, and therefore-a new civilizational leap of Soviet society.

SECTION 1: Background behind the creation of the Great plan for the transformation of nature

Direct material damage from the war and temporary occupation of part of the territory of the USSR by the enemy is estimated at 678 billion rubles (in pre-war prices), which is close to the total value of all Soviet investments for the first four five-year plans [Chuntulov, p.261].

Hitlerites and their accomplices completely or partially destroyed 1710 cities and over 70 thousand villages and villages, liquidated 31,850 enterprises, plundered 98 thousand collective farms, 1876 state farms, 2890 MTS, destroyed 65 thousand km of railways from 4100 railway stations, blew up 13 thousand bridges, caused other destruction. [Criminal goal..., sec. 310-311]

The plan for the post-war reconstruction of the national economy of the USSR provided for the allocation of 338.7 billion rubles to the economy in order to restore 3200 enterprises in the former occupied territories and build another 2700 new industrial facilities in other regions of the country [Chuntulov, p.262]. This breakthrough was to a large extent facilitated by monetary reform, the idea of ​​which was born back in 1943–1944. [Zverev, p.231–232], however, the implementation immediately after the war turned out to be impossible, largely due to the consequences of the monstrous drought of 1946 [Spitsyn, p.17].

The drought zone of 1946-1947 occupied 5 million square kilometers (over 20% of the territory of the USSR) within the limits of the European part of the country at latitudes from 55° in the north to 35° in the south, which included Ukraine, Moldova, the Lower Volga region, the North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth region of the RSFSR [Koldanov, p.32; Spitsyn, p.17].

Because of the drought, the delivery of grain to the state only by collective farms of the Lower Volga region, for example, fell in comparison with 1945 by 21.7% in the Astrakhan region, 2 times in Saratov, 2.1 times in Stalingrad [Kuznetsova, p. 235]. In the first post-war years, the main production of legumes and many industrial crops was concentrated within the drought zone, as well as the largest industrial settlements with a high population, so the agrarian crisis was not only of local importance, but threatened to disrupt the plan for the restoration of the national economy and provoke a decline in the whole. The agricultural problem had to be solved against the background of the rapidly deteriorating international situation: as part of the policy of "containment of the USSR", according to the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947) - an American echo of the Fulton speech of W. Churchill (March 5, 1946) - the US government in March 1948 introduced export licenses that prohibited the export of most American goods to the Soviet Union [Katasonov, p. 32].

Under these conditions, Stalin returned to the project of integrated agroforestry in the steppe zone, the idea of which was first proposed in 1924 [korchemkina, p. 31]. For these purposes, it was planned to allocate 15 million rubles, but then the country, which was preparing for forced industrialization and had not yet completed collective farm construction, did not have the material resources or the human resources to implement such a large-scale task.

Forest plantations in the steppe and forest-steppe zones were carried out in Russia-the USSR long before 1948. but until the 19th century, it was mainly aimed at restoring the ship's and commercial forests. The practice of reforestation was established by Peter the Great in the 1720s, but until the 19th century it was mainly aimed at restoring the ship's and commercial forests. Exceptions to this rule are rare (e.g., protective forest plantations of the Don Cossacks on the Khopor River in the 18th century). [Mikhin]). The scientific substantiation of steppe afforestation for the purposes of protective, erosion control and reclamation purposes was an outstanding discovery of the Russian scientists of the XIX century - P.A. Kostychev, A.A. Izmailsky, V.B. Dokuchaev, N.G. Vysotsky, etc., who developed the system of dry agriculture [Logginov, p.5]. At the same time steppe forestries were created, the first of which was the Veliko-Anadolskoye (1843) in Yekaterinburg province [Yerusalimskiy, p.123].

A turning point in the history of steppe agroforestry is considered to be the period of Activity of V. V. Dokuchaev's Special expedition of the Voronezh province (1892-1898) in response to the drought of 1891, which covered 26 provinces and was accompanied by a terrible famine. During the expedition on the territory of the so-called Stone Steppe the system of protective forest plantations was created for the first time, an integral part of which were ponds [erusalimsky, p. 124]. As a result of the research, Dokuchayev proposed, among other things, a program of the following measures to regulate water management in the open steppes: (a) creation of pond systems in watershed steppe areas, the banks of which should be planted with trees; (b) planting of hedge rows; (c) continuous planting of forests in all areas inconvenient for arable land, "especially if they are open to strong winds" [Dokuchaev, p.104]. Similar conclusions were reached independently by climatologist A.I. Voyeikov, geologist V.A. Obruchev, chemist and economist D.I. Mendeleev [Kovda, p.16]. The latter in his “Explanatory Tariff” (1892) emphasized that “not only measures protecting forests from further reducing their proportion in all provinces where forests are less than 20% in area, but also stimulating intensified afforestation, are of particular state and direct agricultural importance. where the forest area is less than 10% of the entire surface ”[Mendeleev, p.306].

Like D.I. Mendeleev, many Russian scientists believed that growing forests in the steppe was a matter of national importance and, moreover, a manifestation of patriotism. In 1884, the forester M.K. Turskiy, having visited the Great Anadolu, said with fervent love: "You have to be there, on the spot, you have to see the Great Anadolu forest with your own eyes to understand all the greatness of the steppe afforestation, which is our pride. No words can describe the satisfying feeling that this forest oasis causes among the vast steppe on the visitor. It is indeed our pride, because in Western Europe you will not find anything like this" [quoted from: Koldanov,]

In Soviet times, the beginning of protective afforestation occurred in 1918, when the "Basic Law on Forests" was adopted (May 27), where the planting of forest crops was included in the number of planned reforestation measures. More detailed instructions are given by the Decree of the Council of Labor and Defense on combating drought (April 1921). The second period of steppe afforestation in the USSR is associated with the results of the All-Union Conference on Combating Drought (1931), where it was decided to plant 3 million hectares of forest mainly in the Volga region [Koldanov, p.23]. In total from 1931 to 1941. 844.5 thousand hectares of forest lands were laid, of which 465.2 thousand hectares fell on the share of field-protecting forest strips [Pisarenko, p.8]. The Great Patriotic War interrupted the development of steppe afforestation in the country. However, the drought of 1946 showed that in the experimental plots protected by forest belts, the grain yield is 3-4 times higher than on neighboring lands and reaches 6-17 centners per ha [Koldanov, p. 28; Prasolov, p.11]. The fight against drought by afforestation is one of the most important work vectors of the newly formed (in April 1947) USSR Ministry of Forestry [Koldanov, p.32]. In 1948, the third period began in the development of steppe afforestation in the Soviet Union, when, based on the teachings of Dokuchaev-Kostychev, a comprehensive 15-year project for agroforestry in the arid zone was created - the Great Stalinist Plan for the Transformation of Nature.

Continued in comments

Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, born on this day in 1888, was a Bolshevik revolutionary, Soviet politician, and Marxist theorist.

Nikolay Bukharin, the second son of Ivan Gavrilovich and Liubov Ivanovna Bukharin, was born in Moscow on 27th September 1888. His parents were primary school teachers and they helped him get a good education. He was brought up with progressive political views and took part in the 1905 Revolution.

As a young man, Bukharin joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1906, becoming a member of the Bolshevik faction. He served on a committee that was infiltrated by the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, and was imprisoned and exiled in 1911.

In 1911, Bukharin escaped exile, fleeing to Germany. During this period, he met Vladimir Lenin for the first time and authored "Imperialism and World Economy", a work that predated and influenced Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism".

After Lenin's death in 1924, Bukharin became a full member of the Politburo, allying himself with Stalin in the power struggles of that period. Bukharin formulated the thesis of "Socialism in One Country" put forth by Stalin in 1924, which argued that socialism could be developed in a single country, even one as underdeveloped as Russia.

Bukharin was aligned with the forces that defeated Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, and Grigory Zinoviev in various power struggles within the Communist Party. A supporter of the market-based New Economic Policy (NEP), Bukharin opposed Stalin's support of collectivization policies in the late 1920. On this basis, he was criticized and began politically conspiring against Stalin.

After the trial and execution of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other leftist Old Bolsheviks in 1936, Bukharin was arrested in 1937 and charged with conspiring to overthrow the Soviet state. The following trial was controversial and drew international criticism, alienating some communist sympathizers abroad.

"We see now that infringement of freedom is necessary with regard to the opponents of the revolution. At a time of revolution we cannot allow freedom for the enemies of the people and of the revolution. That is a surely clear, irrefutable conclusion."

• Nikolai Bukharin

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Wmill's Moscow Problems :cyber-lenin:

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Guessing the sum of spots on hidden faces

In the tower of three dice, you need only glance at the face of the top of the tower and you know the sum of five face: those on the four faces where two dice touch one another and the face on the bottom of the tower. In the diagram, the sum is 17.

Explain.

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