this post was submitted on 09 Sep 2024
119 points (95.4% liked)

Cybersecurity

5646 readers
160 users here now

c/cybersecurity is a community centered on the cybersecurity and information security profession. You can come here to discuss news, post something interesting, or just chat with others.

THE RULES

Instance Rules

Community Rules

If you ask someone to hack your "friends" socials you're just going to get banned so don't do that.

Learn about hacking

Hack the Box

Try Hack Me

Pico Capture the flag

Other security-related communities !databreaches@lemmy.zip !netsec@lemmy.world !cybersecurity@lemmy.capebreton.social !securitynews@infosec.pub !netsec@links.hackliberty.org !cybersecurity@infosec.pub !pulse_of_truth@infosec.pub

Notable mention to !cybersecuritymemes@lemmy.world

founded 1 year ago
MODERATORS
kid@sh.itjust.works
Lanky_Pomegranate530@midwest.social
119
New RAMBO Attack Uses RAM Radio Signals to Steal Data from Air-Gapped Networks (thehackernews.com)
submitted 2 months ago by kid@sh.itjust.works to c/cybersecurity@sh.itjust.works
17 comments fedilink hide all child comments
you are viewing a single comment's thread
view the rest of the comments
[–] hellfire103@lemmy.ca 10 points 2 months ago (4 children)

Okay, that's scary. I'm not a target by many stretches, but this is pretty serious.

For anyone who (unlike me, who hasn't started yet) has completed some kind of qualification in cybersecurity: would it be better to use Faraday rooms/cages, or to revert to pen and paper (with old-fashioned cryptography, if necessary)?

[–] NaibofTabr@infosec.pub 28 points 2 months ago (1 children)

As always with attacks of this kind, it requires the air-gapped network to be first compromised through other means – such as a rogue insider, poisoned USB drives, or a supply chain attack – thereby allowing the malware to trigger the covert data exfiltration channel.

This goes on the list with other attacks that are interesting in an academic sense but highly impractical for real-world attacks, like Van Eck phreaking.

You have to deploy the malware that manipulates the RAM to get it to create the radio signal on the target system, and since we're talking about an air-gapped system that means you have to be in the room with it already.

This article is light on specifics, but a RAM board is not an efficient radio antenna and it operates at 3-5v, so the transmission can't be very strong. The receiver will have to be nearby, and in a relatively noise-free radio environment. Electrical wiring in the walls would mess with the signal transmission, the wall material might just block it, and if the target system is in a metal case that's electrically grounded (which is normal for desktops and servers) I doubt the signal would get out of it. My guess is that the receiving antenna would need to be in the same room.

[–] Lojcs@lemm.ee 7 points 2 months ago* (last edited 2 months ago)

Since the attack already involves someone with physical access they could hide a transmitter in the same room

Copied from another thread:

Fast transmissions are limited to a maximum range of 300 cm (10 ft), with the bit error rate being 2-4%. Medium-speed transmissions increase the distance to 450 cm (15 ft) for the same error rate. Finally, slow transmissions with nearly zero error rates can work reliably over distances of up to 7 meters (23 ft).

Fast = 1000bps, medium = 500bps, slow = 100bps.

[–] refalo@programming.dev 4 points 2 months ago

faraday cage does not protect against very low frequencies, those can still pass through.

[–] linearchaos@lemmy.world 3 points 2 months ago

Meh, physical security is king.

You keep em out of your building, out of your parking lot, if you want to shield the outside, that's ok, but simply don't let them in to snoop.