cucumovirus

The point isn't to disprove determinism, and definitely isn't to do so in favor of free will. The point is to achieve a dialectical materialist understanding as opposed to a mechanical one.

In your previous thread you say this about "sentience":

yeah, but what is it? how does it have free will? isn’t it just regular matter subject to conditions, not able to make decisions.

Firstly, I think there's some confusion about free will and will. Free will is an idealist notion that essentially our minds can operate above or outside of the laws of physics. That is clearly false. Just will, on the other hand, doesn't have idealist connotations. I think that's an error your interlocutor made in that thread, or a general error of not defining the terms discussed. An error I think you've made here and in general is opposing the two positions of mechanical determinism and free will in a dichotomy as the only possibilities.

I'm partial to @redtea@lemmygrad.ml's thought about there being a category error. I think your mistake is in thinking that everything is infinitely reducible into smaller parts, and also without loss of context. In more general terms, I don't think you've fully grasped dialectics.

We know from dialectics that relational properties are very important, and abstracting things doesn't let us analyze them properly. I think you're missing a key concept of dialectics when you assume that the parts that make up the whole are ontologically primary and exist separately from the whole while still being the same parts that make it up. I mean this in the sense that different bits of matter make up us, so from their properties you assume it's clear that no will exists because atoms aren't sentient. Your mistake is in not recognizing that our sentience is a property of matter. Not of abstract matter in general, but of the specific organization of matter which results in us. You say "regular matter" as if some other kind of matter would need to exist for sentience to exist.

A simpler example can be made from the properties of water. A single molecule of water doesn't have surface tension. Following your mechanical model, we cannot really explain how water, when organized in a larger body, does. This is in general a fault of the Cartesian reductionist model which predominates in science today instead of dialectics. The concept which is usually used here is that of emergent properties, but it doesn't really explain anything by itself. Dialectics on the other hand doesn't even see a problem here to explain because a water molecule on its own and a water molecule in a larger body of water are two different things. The parts of the whole don't exist separately from that whole as its parts.

The properties of the whole and the individual parts of that whole don't exist separately from their interactions as parts of that whole. These properties only come into existence from the interactions of the parts and the whole. By simply studying individual water molecules, you would never discover surface tension. Parts interact with each other and with the whole, and the whole interacts with all the parts. A common example of this in Marxism are the base-superstructure relations. None of the components of either the base or the superstructure exist on their own, they are parts of the whole that is our society. The economic base tends to have a stronger influence on the superstructure, but the specific relations are constantly changing.

Here's a quote from Sayers' critique of mechanical materialism:

This is the dialectical account of history given by Marx, and it differs entirely from Cohen’s mechanical interpretation. The differences are clearly spelled out by Engels in the well known series of letters that he wrote towards the end of his life. In them he insists that the economic system and the superstructure are not simply the immediate and direct products of the prevailing form of production. Although their character is certainly conditioned predominantly by the development of the productive forces, it cannot be reduced to this factor alone. On the contrary, the economic system, for example, acquires its own distinctive character and its own inner dynamic. Through the division of labour, trade and commerce become areas of activity increasingly independent of production. They acquire, in short, a degree of “relative autonomy”.

Where there is division of labour on a social scale, there the different labour processes become independent of each other. In the last instance production is the decisive factor. But as soon as trade in products becomes independent of production proper, it follows a movement of its own, which, while it is governed as a whole by production, still in particular respects and within this general dependence follows laws of its own: this movement has phases of its own and in turn reacts on the movement of production.

The same is true, even more clearly, of political and legal institutions and of art, religion and philosophy. None is purely “functional” to the development of production. Each of these spheres, while in general being determined by the development of production and by economic forces, has its own relatively autonomous process of development, its own relative independence. Each affects the others and the material base.

Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all of these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic condition is the cause and alone active, while everything else is only a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.

Another way to put this is through the constancy of change in dialectics and the build up of quantitative change into qualitative leaps. You cannot simply "go down a level" of quality and look at the quantitative aspects of the lower level to understand everything in the higher. The surface tension example can again be used here.

Taking from all the points above, we are active parts of the whole, our societies, our history, and we have constant and mutual interactions with each other, with the other parts, and with the whole. Our wills and choices (still far from free) do matter here very much and we do make the choices. Our consciousness is a key part of the process of our history, as is also seen in the notion that freedom is the recognition of necessity. Therefore, to deny our conscious will (not free will, which is idealist) and its effects is a mistake, and akin to saying that water doesn't have the property of surface tension because an individual water molecule doesn't, or arguing that social constructs aren’t real.

This doesn't "disprove determinism" in general, and it doesn't seek to. It's just a proper contextualization of phenomena and processes. It does highlight the limitations and mistakes of mechanical determinism. Out of the specific interactions of the organizations of matter that make up us, come the properties of consciousness, thought, will, etc. Our will is simply a property of matter organized in a specific manner. There is no need to assume any metaphysics or idealism to describe our wills.

Another quote form Sayers to hopefully round this out:

Even in the realm of purely inorganic, physical phenomena, the mechanical view is an abstract and metaphysical one. It portrays physical objects in an idealised fashion, as unaffected by their relations.

[...]

Of course, the mechanical outlook has played an extremely important role in the development of the scientific understanding of nature, and it is not my intention to reject such methods and assumptions altogether. The error comes when such methods and assumptions are made into a universal philosophy and emphasised in an exclusive and one-sided fashion. Their abstract character is forgotten and they are employed as though they alone formed an adequate basis for understanding reality. The result is an abstract and metaphysical view of the world.

I'm not saying we have free will, or that our choices aren't materially and socially determined, I'm saying that we still do make those choices, and I'm cautioning against mechanical materialism that turns into pessimistic or nihilistic fatalism. We are parts of the whole, and we are conscious of it. We are active parts of the historical process and our history happens through our actions. Do you dispute Marx's framing I quoted above?

Just to preface this, I'm not arguing against the critique of the reactionary position in this meme, but speaking more generally and trying to round out understanding of the whole philosophical argument. We clearly know that the idealist free will position is inaccurate, but the mechanical determinist position doesn't give us the full picture either.

While our lives are shaped by our material conditions, we should always keep dialectical materialism in mind and not fall into a purely mechanical determinism that becomes a pessimistic or nihilistic fatalism.

From Gramsci:

We can observe how the determinist, fatalist mechanist element has been an immediate ideological “aroma” of Marxism, a form of religion and of stimulation (but like a drug necessitated and historically justified by the “subordinate” character of certain social strata).

When one does not have the initiative in the struggle and the struggle itself is ultimately identified with a series of defeats, mechanical determinism becomes a formidable power of moral resistance, of patient and obstinate perseverance. “I am defeated for the moment but the nature of things is on my side over a long period,” etc. Real will is disguised as an act of faith, a sure rationality of history, a primitive and empirical form of impassioned finalism which appears as a substitute for the predestination, providence, etc., of the confessional religions. We must insist on the fact that even in such a case there exists in reality a strong active will, a direct influence on the “nature of things,” but it is certainly in an implicit and veiled form, ashamed of itself, and so the consciousness of it is contradictory, lacks critical unity, etc. But when the “subordinate” becomes the leader and is responsible for the economic activity of the mass, mechanicalism appears at a certain moment as an imminent danger, there occurs a revision of the whole mode of thinking because there has taken place a change in the social mode of being.

We should always keep in mind that, despite the limitations imposed on us by material conditions and history, we are parts of the whole and not just passive entities being directed by outside forces. Our actions and choices, especially collective ones, do matter and are what shapes our societies.

As Marx puts it:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.

I've started reading it in December, and I'm also really liking it! Way ahead of it's time compared to mainstream Russian politics and philosophy of the 1860s, and despite not coming into contact with Marx & Engels, Chernyshevsky's own philosophy is remarkably close to dialectical materialism. It's a book that should definitely be more widely known, especially among Marxists. A rare piece of great revolutionary literature!

Based on this comment, I think you'd also enjoy Gramsci's The Revolution against Das Kapital (1917)!

Yes, I also quite like NYE, I don't know why he chose to write about it in particular, maybe it was worse in his time. However, his point about about bourgeois holidays and commemorations of historical events that have no meaning to the vast majority of today's people I find to be correct. There are several such "holidays" in my country which the bourgeoisie basically forces, and which the majority of people don't care about. I guess getting the day off is still nice though.

I agree, it has that vibe a bit, and I have no particular problem with New Year's, but his general point is definitely correct when it comes to some bourgeois holidays and commemorations of specific historical events that really don't have any meaning to the vast majority today. I can think of several examples that are "celebrated" in my country.

I think prolewiki has a good overview: https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Wikipedia

No such thing as brainwashing:

https://redsails.org/masses-elites-and-rebels/

Your comment here is way too favorable to the tzar. There was plenty of racism against the non-Russian peoples in the empire. Plenty of pogroms and other horrors committed. The "Great Russians" were very chauvinistic in their attitude towards the other nationalities, and were very privileged in what positions they could occupy, for example. An important part of Bolshevik propaganda was fighting against racism and "Great Russian" chauvinism.

From Walter Rodney's 'The Russian Revolution: A View from the Third World':

There was a group of people known as Russians, who ruled over Finns, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Mongolians, and Turks, to name just a few. The Russians monopolized political power and sent their governors and settlers into the countries of these other peoples. As in all colonial states, there was a legal distinction between the citizen (Russian) and the colonial subject. The constitution of Tsarist Russia explicitly based discriminatory measures on the racial or national origin or religion of those affected. It was in some ways like the distinctions made under Portuguese and Belgian colonialism, and under South African and Rhodesian apartheid. In other words, Russian colonial rule hardly differed from that of the Western European powers. The British sent warships; the Russians sent the Cossacks. When its colonial subjects revolted, as Georgian workers and peasants had during the 1905 Revolution, the tsar, as we’ve seen, agreed to a few minor reforms but ultimately crushed the uprising and reverted to the old system of colonialism.

Every colonial relationship in history has involved cultural domination, namely the imposition of language, religion and way of life on the subjugated peoples. In the Russian Empire, there were numerous other religions apart from the Russian Orthodox church. None of these were respected. The Catholics in Polish Russia were persecuted. The Jews were hounded wherever they were found, especially in the Ukraine. The Muslims were treated as enemies of Christian civilization. And those elements of the population who believed in their own family gods and traditional religion were the most despised of all, in the same way that European missionaries came to Africa and denounced African religion as devil worship and black magic. […] When faced with a more technologically advanced culture, such groups were victims of genocidal policies.

I'm not sure what point you're making here. Russian colonialism doesn't change the importance of settler-colonialism in general and specifically in the US. The USSR was built on a basis of national liberation, and not on the "Great Russian" identity which would be analogous to the US identity here.

Another difference is that the US is entirely settler colonial, a whole country founded solely by settlers, while the Russian empire's colonies were all still tied to the metropolitan core in western Russia. The US was created through a revolt of the most reactionary settlers that wanted autonomy from Britain. The path forward for North America is strictly decolonial.

the basis is capitalist

And also settler-colonial, which is a very important factor when it comes to culture in this sense.